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Abstract
If the production of a risk-neutral monopolist is influenced by a
random variable, then the expected profit is decreasing in the variance
of the production process.
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1 Introduction
This paper evaluates the expected profit function of a risk-neutral monop-
olist who carries out a risky production process. If production is influenced
by a random variable, then output and sales price are both random vari-
ables. As they are negatively correlated, the monopolist’s expected revenue
is not just the product of expected output and expected price. Rather, the
expected revenue is smaller. The difference between expected revenue on the
one hand, and the product of expected price and expected output on the
other, increases with the variance of the random variable which influences
the production process. Therefore, the expected profit of the monopolist
is decreasing in the variance. In other words: A risk-neutral monopolist
derives negative marginal utility from variance; he is variance-averse.
2 The model
Consider a monopolist who faces inverse demand p = a − bQ, with a, b >
0, where p denotes the price and Q the quantity of the good he offers.
The monopolist carries out a stochastic production process,1 described by
∗Economics of Business and Law, Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-
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hints.
1Firms may face other sources of risk besides stochastic production, in particular un-
certainty in regulatory policy, see Isik (2005).
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Q(e, η) = e+ η, where e denotes the amount of the only input factor, and η
is a random variable with zero expected value, E[η] = 0, and non-negative
variance Var[η] = σ2 > 0. Hence, E[Q] = e and Var[Q] = σ2.
Assume that a unit of the input factor costs c, with 0 < c < a.2 The
monopolist is risk-neutral, in other words: He seeks to maximize his expected
monetary profit E[π(Q)]; his utility derived from monetary income X is
described by the utility function U(X) = X as well as any positive affine
transformation of U .
Closer inspection of the expected revenue E[p(Q)Q] reveals that price
p(Q) = a−bQ(e, η) and output Q(e, η) are both random variables which are
negatively correlated. Hence, the expected revenue is not just the product
of expected quantity and expected price.
Lemma: The expected revenue of the monopolist is given by E[p(Q)Q] =
ae− be2 − bσ2.
Proof: E[p(Q)Q] =E[aQ− bQ2] = aE[Q]− bE[Q2]. Applying the definition
of variance, σ2 =E[Q2]−(E[Q])2, which is equivalent to E[Q2] = (E[Q])2+σ2,
expected revenue can be rewritten as E[p(Q)Q] = aE[Q] − b(E[Q])2 − bσ2.
Using E[Q] = e leads to E[p(Q)Q] = ae− be2 − bσ2. 
The correlation coefficient between p(Q) and Q(e) is −1, and the covariance
is −bσ2. The Lemma is helpful to demonstrate the main results of this note:
Proposition: i) If a risk-neutral monopolist engages in a stochastic pro-
duction process and faces constant marginal factor cost, then his marginal
utility of output variance is negative. ii) The monopolist chooses the same
expected output level as in the case with risk-free production.
Proof: First, it has to be shown that ∂E[π(Q)]/∂σ2 < 0. Choosing his
input e, the monopolist maximizes E[π(Q)] =E[p(Q(e))Q(e) − ce]. Using
the Lemma, the right hand side can be rewritten as (a − c)e − be2 − bσ2
which implies ∂E[π(Q)]/∂σ2 = −b < 0.
Turning to the second part of the proposition, a monopolist with deter-
ministic production would maximize his profit by choosing an output level
QM = argmax[(a−c)Q−bQ2] = (a−c)/2b, hence eM = (a−c/2b). The first-
order condition for the risk-neutral monopolist with stochastic production
is (a− c)− 2be = 0 who, thus, would also choose the input level eM .
3 Conclusion
If a risk-neutral firm enjoys market power, its firm demand (price-sales
schedule) is decreasing. If, moreover, production is stochastic, then the
2The factor cost c(e) is no random variable, but the marginal cost is a random variable.
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firm derives marginal disutility from the variance of the random variable
that influences production.3 This is a surprising result, as a risk-neutral
decision-maker usually would not care for a mean-preserving spread. The
reason for this effect is the negative correlation between price and output
under imperfect competition.4 The marginal disutility of variance is −b, i.e.,
the slope of the demand curve in the case of a linear demand function.
In a mean-variance-diagram, a risk-neutral decision-maker has horizontal
indifference curves when facing a choice between risky assets. A risk-neutral
monopolist who faces a choice between different risky production processes
would have upwards sloped iso-profit curves in such a diagram: When ac-
cepting a higher variance, he would require higher expected revenues (e.g.,
a higher demand) in order to maintain a specific profit level. His iso-profit
curves, thus, appear as if he was risk-averse,5 because a higher variance
negatively affects the monopolist’s expected profit.
The optimal input decision of the monopolist is unaffected as long as the
variance of the random variable which influences production is independent
of the input level.6 These conjectures regarding the iso-profit curves and the
output choice may prove helpful when trying to test the model empirically.
One interpretation of the stochastic production model could be a principal-
agent-model of the moral hazard type. Under moral hazard, the risk-neutral
principal is unable to verify the agent’s effort. One way to include this into
a model would be a production function with two arguments, agent’s effort
and a random variable.7 This approach would directly lead to the problem
considered here: If, from the principal’s point of view, production is stochas-
tic, and he enjoys price-setting power on the output market, then sales price
and output are negatively correlated random variables, and the expected
revenue had to be adjusted accordingly.8 If the variance in production is
only due to the fact that production has to be carried out by an agent, this
3Holden and Subrahmenyam (2003) start with the assumption that monopolistic
traders are risk-averse and analyze a dynamic model. Yin (2008) studies the behavior
of risk-averse monopolists under a two-part tariff.
4The results obtained for the case of a monopolistic firm could also be applied to
oligopolists producing under risk.
5Risk-aversion in the CAPM is extensively analyzed by Schneeweiss (2003).
6Kaniovski (2003) derives that risk-averse monopolists who decide with regard to as-
piration levels would choose lower output levels, and higher prices than their risk-neutral
counterparts.
7See, e.g., the initial discussion in Lazear and Rosen (1981, 843) on piece-rates as an
incentive contract for single agents. The authors assume that the employer operates in
a competitive product market and, thus, receives a constant price for each output unit.
Gibbons (1987, 418) implicitly assumes the output unit price to be one. Thus, in these
model no (negative) correlation exists between stochastic output and market price.
8With the typical assumption of quadratic effort cost on the agent’s side, the optimal
solution would be e = a/2(1 + b); leaving this modification aside, all results stated in the
Lemma and the Proposition would still hold.
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could be seen as a new, and up to now unexplored, source of agency cost.9
Another application of the model would be the derivation of an optimal spe-
cific investment into a monopoly position with risky production. Neglecting
the variance effect would lead to an overestimation of the expected revenue
(and profit) from such an investment.
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